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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss in detail one of the first conclusions drawn 
by Aristotle in the ergon argument. The paper provides an in-depth approach to 
Nicomachean Ethics’ lines 1098a3-4, where one reads: “λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ 
λόγον ἔχοντος”. I divide the discussion into two parts. In the first part, I put 
under scrutiny how one should take the word “πρακτική” and argue that one 
should avoid taking this word as meaning “practical” in the passage. I will argue 
in favor of taking it as meaning “active”. The exegetical inconvenience of taking 
“πρακτική” as meaning “practical” is the fact that it restricts the results achieved 
in the ergon argument by excluding the possibility of contemplation being 
considered a eudaimon life. In the second part, I discuss the expression “λόγον 
ἔχον” and provide some arguments to take it as preliminarily introducing the 
criterion of division of the virtues that will be spelled out in EN I.13 so that the 
λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul here also makes reference to the virtue of the non-
rational part, i.e., virtue of character. I offer a deflationary view by showing that 
the moral psychology is developed in EN I.7 within the limits imposed by the 
ergon argument. 
 




A introdução da psicologia moral no argumento do ergon 
 
RESUMO: Neste artigo, eu discuto em detalhes uma das primeiras conclusões 
apresentadas por Aristóteles no argumento do ergon. O artigo traz uma discussão 
pormenorizada da afirmação “λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος” nas 
linhas 1098a3-4 da Ética a Nicômaco. Eu divido a discussão em duas partes. Na 
primeira parte, eu coloco em discussão como se deve entender a palavra 
“πρακτική” e argumento que se deve evitar tomá-la como significando “prática”. 
Eu argumentarei em favor de entendê-la como significando “ativa”. O 
inconveniente exegético de tomar “πρακτική” com o significado de “prática” é 
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que tal leitura restringe os resultados alcançados no argumento do ergon ao 
excluir a possibilidade de a vida contemplativa ser considerada uma vida 
eudaimon. Na segunda parte, eu discuto a expressão “λόγον ἔχον” e forneço 
alguns argumentos para entender a expressão como preliminarmente 
introduzindo o critério de divisão de virtudes que será apresentado em EN I.13 
de modo que a expressão “λόγον ἔχον” na passagem discutida deve ser 
entendida como também fazendo referência à virtude da parte não-racional da 
alma, a saber, à virtude do caráter. Eu apresento uma interpretação deflacionária, 
argumentando que a psicologia moral é desenvolvida em EN I.7 tendo em vista 
os interesses argumentativos do argumento do ergon. 
 
Palavras-chave: argumento do ergon; psicologia moral; virtudes; Aristóteles; 
Ética a Nicômaco.
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In the ergon argument, one of the first conclusions drawn by Aristotle is 
that the proper activity of the human being consists in the exercise of the part of 
the soul that has reason. In the Greek language, he formulates his point in the 
following way: λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. In this paper, I intend 
to offer a detailed discussion of this phrase. In order to do so, I will divide the 
phrase into two parts. Firstly, I will discuss what Aristotle meant with “πρακτική 
τις”, for it is not completely clear how this expression is to be taken. I will argue 
against the possibility of seeing in this expression an exclusive reference to the 
practical life in opposition to a life devoted to contemplation. If “πρακτική” is 
understood in the sense of “practical”, two irreconcilable views on eudaimonia 
seem to be held by Aristotle within the EN. In EN X.6-8, he flatly affirms that 
contemplation is a eudaimon life. However, if the ergon argument is interpreted in 
a restrictive way so that the human proper activity (and, by consequence, 
happiness) consists exclusively in the kind of activity involved in the practical 
life, the results attained in EN X.6.8 would be in disagreement with what was 
established in EN I.7. I will argue in favor of a view that advocates a broader 
meaning to the word “πρακτική” by taking it as meaning “active” in the passage. 
This option has the advantage of reconciling the two supposedly opposing views. 
At the second moment, my attention will be focused on the expression “τοῦ 
λόγον ἔχοντος”. I will argue in favor of the view that takes one of the ways of 
being said “λόγον ἔχον” as already introducing the kind of rationality proper to 
the virtue of character in EN I.13. Against Fortenbaugh, I will defend the claim 
that the part of the soul that is characterized as obedient to reason in EN I.7 
should not be understood as being part of the rational part of the soul that is 
rational strictly speaking. 
 
1. EN I.7: the moral psychology vocabulary 
 
The ergon argument is considerably built around Aristotle’s moral 
psychology. The argument is put forward as an attempt to provide a preliminary 
account of the concept of eudaimonia, which constitutes Aristotle’s leading 
investigative interest in EN I and which will see the end of its investigation only 
in EN X.6-8. The moral psychology that emerges in EN I.7 needs to be adequately 
grasped because it is a prelude of the classification of virtues in EN I.13 and a 
correct construal of the passage plays a decisive role in providing a proper 
characterization of the virtues of character and of thought. 
The ergon argument starts out by introducing the idea of the proper 
activity of the human being (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) (EN 1097b24-25). In what 
follows, Aristotle illustrates his point by saying that the crafts (EN 1097b25-26 
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and 1097b28-29) and the animal organs (EN 1097b30-31) have their own proper 
activity. And, in such cases, the good and the doing well (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ) of 
these things reside in the excellent performance of their proper activity (EN 
1097b27-28). This last argumentative step is developed further in EN 1098a7-12 
(see also EN 1106a15-24). That said, Aristotle proceeds with the task of finding 
out what is precisely the proper activity of the human being (EN 1097b33). The 
investigation proceeds in the following way: 
 
T1 (i) τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται 
δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. 
ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ 
καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος: 
(ii) τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχον καὶ 
διανοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
θετέον: κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. (iii) εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον 
ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου [...] (EN 
1097b34-1098a8). 
 
(i) For being alive is obviously shared by plants too, and we are 
looking for what is peculiar to human beings. In that case we must 
divide off the kind of life that consists in taking in nutriment and 
growing. Next to consider would be some sort of life of perception, 
but this too is evidently shared, by horses, oxen, and every other 
animal. There remains an active/practical life of what possesses 
reason; (ii) and of this, one part ‘possesses reason’ in so far as it is 
obedient to reason, while the other possesses it in so far as it actually 
has it, and itself thinks. Since this life, too, is spoken of in two ways, 
we must posit the life in the sense of activity; for this seems to be 
the more proper sense. (iii) Now if the function of man is an activity 
of soul based on reason or not without reason [...]1 
 
In the whole step T1.i, Aristotle discriminates the different kinds of life in 
order to find out the proper activity of human beings. As life is shared by natural 
beings at distinct levels2, his efforts will be concentrated in establishing what kind 
 
1 All the translations of EN’s passages were taken from Broadie and Rowe (2002). I made some 
changes in the translations when I considered that it had philosophical implications. The Greek text 
is from Bywater’s edition (1894). 
2 What Aristotle means by “kinds of lives” is made clear in some passages from De Anima: “by ‘life’ we 
mean that which has through itself nourishment, growth, and decay” (ζωὴ ν δὲ λὲ γομὲν τὴ ν δι' αὑ τοὑ  
τροφὴ ν τὲ και αὑ ξὴσιν και φθι σιν) (De Anima 412a13-15, Shield’s translation) and “but living is 
spoken of in several ways. And should even one of these belong to something, we say that it is alive: 
reason, perception, motion and rest with respect to place, and further the motion in relation to 
nourishment, decay, and growth” (πλὲοναχω ς δὲ τοὑ  ζὴ ν λὲγομὲ νοὑ, κα ν ὲ ν τι τοὑ των ὲ νὑπα ρχῃ 
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of life is proper to human beings. With this purpose in mind, he rules out the life 
of nutrition (θρεπτική ζωή) and growth (αὐξητική ζωή), which are plainly shared 
even by plants. In what follows, he does the same concerning the life of 
perception (αἰσθητική ζωή), which, in spite of not being shared by plants, is 
shared by animals and, in reason of that, cannot be classified as a proper feature 
of human beings. After this argumentative move, Aristotle is left with a rational 
kind of life: an active/practical life of what possesses reason. In the formulation 
in Greek: λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Aristotle’s phrasing is quite 
puzzling and has given rise to some pressing exegetical questions, as I show in 
the following sections. The conclusion attained by him is compactly formulated. 
In what follows, I would like to argue that the details of the last sentence of the 
passage T1.i are fleshed out in the passage T1.ii, in other words, the latter passage 
should be taken as making explicit the results achieved in the former one. 
What is, I think, hardly open to disagreement among the interpreters is 
that the word “ζωή” is implicit in the line 1098a3 in the expression “πρακτική 
τις”, as well as in the line 1098a2 in the expression “αἰσθητική τις”. The word is 
employed in the line 1098a1 and, then, taken for granted in the sequence of the 
passage3. The agreement, however, ends here and there are plenty of divergences 
in the interpretation of the details. 
 
2. The Greek Adjective “πρακτική” in line 1098a2: a controversy 
 
The meaning of the word “πρακτική” in the line 1098a3 is a matter of 
dispute and has been a cause for controversy. If the Greek adjective is roughly 
transliterated into English, one obtains the word “practical”, a word tends to be 
easily associated with the idea of actions. This association should not be taken for 
granted, however. As I intend to show, this word has a broader meaning, which 
should not be restricted to the idea of actions and ultimately of moral actions. 
In his translation, Rowe (2002) opts to render the passage in the following 
way “a practical sort of life of what possesses reason”. In his French translation, 
Tricot (2007) suggests a solution similar to Rowe’s: “une certaine vie pratique de 
la partie rationnelle de l’âme”. Although the word “practical” is not present in 
Crisp’s translation (2000), he renders the text in such a way that the kernel of the 
passage is built around the idea of action: “a life, concerned in some way with 
action”. Similarly, Irwin (1999) translates “some sort of life of action of the [part 
of the soul] that has reason”. The problem of associating the Greek word 
 
μο νον, ζὴ ν αὑ το  φαμὲν, οι ον νοὑ ς, αι σθὴσις, κι νὴσις και στα σις ὴ  κατα  το πον, ὲ τι κι νὴσις ὴ  κατα  
τροφὴ ν και φθι σις τὲ και αὑ ξὴσις) (De Anima 413a22-25, Shield’s translation). 
3 All the translations consulted read the passage in that way: Gauthier and Jolif (1958), Irwin (1999), 
Crisp (2000), Broadie and Rowe (2002), Ross revised by Lesley Brown (2009). In the same vein, 
Stewart’s (1892, p. 99), Burnet’s (1900, p. 35), and Joachim’s (1951, p. 51) comments. 
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“πρακτική” with the English words “action” and “practical” (or “pratique” in 
French) is the disconcerting implication that these options carry to the ergon 
argument. If one assumes that at this point Aristotle’s intention is to restrict the 
human ergon to the life of action, i.e., the kind of practical life implied in the moral 
life, there will be the difficulty to reconcile this result with the conclusion reached 
in EN X.7, according to which human happiness (εὐδαιμονία) also consists in 
contemplation. Given this scenario, it becomes clear that the translations quoted 
end up inconveniently constraining the reading of EN I.7 and make it clash with 
the conclusions about εὐδαιμονία drawn in EN X.74. 
Even though the Greek word “πρακτική” and its cognates are undeniably 
linked to the idea of action in a strict sense, I mean, in the sense of moral action 
(a couple of pieces of textual evidence for this view: EN 1140b21, 1141b17, 
1143b24, 1143b27, 1144a11-12, 1146a8, and 1152a9), I would like to argue for a 
different meaning to this word in EN I.7. I will side with those translators who 
prefer to translate “πρακτική” as “active” (Burnet 1900, p. 35, Joachim 1951, p. 51, 
Gauthier and Jolif 1958, p. 15, and 1959, p. 56 (“active” in French), and Ross 
revised by Lesley 2009, p. 11). For Burnet, Gauthier, and Jolif, the word does not 
rule out the activity involved in contemplation and should be taken in a broad 
sense which includes θεωρία. The general idea conveyed by the translation 
“active” is that the part possessing reason must be regularly exercised, so that 
one may safely say that reason has an active life, in contrast to an inactive life. In 
such a reading, the association of the word “πρακτική” to the notion of moral 
actions is weakened, but it is not completely dismissed. An active life of the part 
possessing reason also involves the exercise of reason in the practical sphere, but 
the practical rationality is no longer the primary focus of the argument. Trying to 
keep the translation of “πρακτική” as “action”, Stewart paraphrases the passage 
in the following way: “a life consisting in the action of the rational part” (1892, p. 
99). The idea behind Stewart’s translation is acutely akin to the one imparted by 
“active”: the proper activity of human beings consists in the action of their reason, 
in other words, in an active life of reason. An additional point to be made is that, 
in the entry “πρακτικός, ή, όν”, Liddell & Scott (9th edn. 1996, p. 1458) lists “active” 
and also “effective” as possible translations. 
One of the advantages of taking “πρακτική” as having the meaning of 
“active” is that, by doing so, Aristotle does not commit himself to a specific sort 
of rational activity at this moment of the EN. And that is a good exegetical 
 
4 Lawrence uses the following translation of the passage: “a practical life of the part having reason”, 
and it leads him to the same set of questions as I am advancing. He proposes a very sketchy construal 
of the passage to address the questions. According to him, the sense of action involved in the passage 
is strongly related to the idea of rational choice (προαι ρὲσις), for not even gods make rational 
decisions in the sense that human beings do, and, even when humans beings contemplate, it may be 
done based on a decision (Lawrence 2001, p. 459). In his view, Aristotle singles out a feature that is 
proper to human beings and so finds the kind of feature demanded by the ergon argument. 
Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira 
RÓNAI – Revista de Estudos Clássicos e Tradutórios, ISSN 2318-3446, Vol. 8, n. 2, 2020, p. 375-391 
381 
outcome, for, had he argued otherwise, he would be advancing more than the 
occasion allows. The inquiry is at the very beginning and Aristotle is still in need 
of investigating adequately the notion of virtue, something which is done from 
EN I.13 to VI.13, when the virtues of character and of thought are put under 
scrutiny. Moreover, Aristotle himself points out that the ergon argument plays 
the role of providing a sketchy delimitation of εὐδαιμονία (EN 1098a20-23). 
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that its results are formulated at a 
general level and that its details will be spelled out later in the sequence of the 
investigation. Additionally, this translation does not clash with the philosophical 
conclusion drawn in EN X. 6-8, which establishes that the life of contemplation is 
also a eudaimon life. 
In order to dispel the objection that “πρακτική” is invariably related only to 
moral actions, let me quote a passage from Aristotle’s Politics: 
 
T2 ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν 
θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος 
ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, 
καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας 
πρακτικάς, τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ 
πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὑτῶν ἕνεκεν 
θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις: ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις 
(Politics 1325b14-21). 
 
If this is well said, and we should assume that eudaimonia is good 
activity, then the active life is best both collectively for the whole 
city and also for each individual. But it is not necessary for the 
active life to be one lived in relation to others, as some believe, nor 
are those thoughts alone active which we have in order to get 
results from action; much more active are those contemplations and 
thoughts that are complete in themselves and for their own sake. 
For good action is the end, and therefore a certain kind of action is 
also the end (Kraut’s translation). 
 
In this passage, both the life of actions and the life of contemplation, which 
is described as “contemplations and thoughts that are complete in themselves 
and for their own sake”, are openly recognized as πρακτικοί βίοι. The passage is 
very enlightening in relation to EN I.7. First, it gives to the Greek adjective 
“πρακτικός” the meaning for which I have argued, encompassing θεωρία, and, by 
this reason, settles the question about whether “πρακτική” in EN I.7 must be 
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necessarily associated to moral actions5. Given the textual evidence quoted, the 
answer to this question is clearly negative. Second, Aristotle emphasizes that 
both contemplation and moral action have as their goals a successful 
performance (εὐπραξία). By doing so, Aristotle endorses the claim that εὐδαιμονία 
consists in the excellent performance of such activities, a point assumed in outline 
at the very start of the passage just quoted when he says: τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 
εὐπραγίαν θετέον. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that what is at stake in 1098a3 
in the EN is an attempt to emphasize, with the Greek adjective “πρακτική”, that 
the human ergon consists in the exercise of reason and not only in its possession. 
It is not enough to possess reason, but, in order to be eudaimon, it is necessary to 
make it active through its use. I think that a decisive argument in favor of that 
point is provided in the step T1.ii. 
In step T1.ii, Aristotle claims that the life of the λόγον-ἔχον part is said in 
two ways (EN 1098a5) – even though he presents only one of them – and then 
lays down which one he is arguing for (EN 1098a6). In my view, what Aristotle 
is doing is an attempt to emphasize and state clearer what was previously 
expressed by the use of the adjective “πρακτική”: the life of the λόγον-ἔχον part, 
he adds, is said in the sense of activity (κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν). As Aristotle does not say 
which opposition he had in mind, one of the options is to assume that the 
opposition intended was between activity (ἐνέργεια) and disposition (ἕξις). 
Gauthier and Jolif (1959, p. 57-58), as well as Stewart (1892, p. 99-100) and Burnet 
(1900, p. 35), take the passage in that way. Such an approach is backed up by a 
passage taken from the chapter that comes right after the ergon argument: 
 
T3 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ 
λόγος: ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ 
μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ 
ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν 
ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν 
δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε: πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ 
δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ 
οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται (EN 
1098b33-1099a7). 
 
Well, our account is in harmony with those who say that eudaimonia 
is virtue, or some form of virtue; for ‘activity in accordance with 
 
5 An important remark to be made is that what my interpretation tries to avoid is the association of 
the Greek word “πρακτική” with the sense of the word “practical” in the English language that 
excludes (or that, at least, is not obviously related to) a life of thought, i.e., a contemplative life. If 
“practical” is taken in the loose sense of activity, someone may eventually say that the life of 
contemplation is practical because it involves the activity (or action) of contemplation. I’m indebted 
to one of the anonymous refereer for calling my attention to this point. 
Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira 
RÓNAI – Revista de Estudos Clássicos e Tradutórios, ISSN 2318-3446, Vol. 8, n. 2, 2020, p. 375-391 
383 
virtue’ belongs to virtue. But perhaps it makes no little difference 
whether we suppose the chief good to be located in the possession 
of virtue, or in its use, i.e. in a disposition or in a form of activity. 
For it is possible for the disposition to be present and yet to produce 
nothing good, as for example in the case of the person who is asleep, 
or in some other way rendered inactive, but the same will not hold 
of the activity: the person will necessarily be doing something, and 
will do (it) well. Just as at the Olympic Games it is not the finest and 
the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for the 
winners come from among these), so too in life it is the doers that 
become achievers of fine and good things – and rightly so. 
 
In this passage, Aristotle advances the claim that εὐδαιμονία is not to be 
found in mere virtuous disposition but in the virtuous activity. In Aristotle’s own 
terms, not in ἕξις but in ἐνέργεια. This passage lends support to the interpretation 
according to which Aristotle had in mind the opposition between ἕξις and 
ἐνέργεια when he affirmed that the life of the λόγον-ἔχον part is said in two ways. 
Disposition (ἕξις) is a fully-fledged concept in the EN, which is developed in book 
II. In a general description, it means a highly developed disposition that enables 
its possessor to do something in a certain way. If one endorses this opposition, 
the underlying idea in the passage will be that, provided that the person intends 
to achieve eudaimonia, he cannot just have a virtuous disposition (in this case a 
good disposition related to the λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul) and then not put it to 
use. The acquired disposition needs to be exercised. Another possibility, which 
also fits the context, is to suppose that the opposition is between ἐνέργεια and 
δύναμις, as Irwin’s translation suggests (1999). In this case, the point is similar to 
the previous one, at least in its general lines: given that an individual intends to 
have eudaimonia, reason cannot be idle, I mean, it cannot be just an available 
capacity, it must be exercised. Regardless of the option chosen, my main point 
holds in both scenarios: the expression “κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν” plays the role of making 
explicit what was previously given by the word “πρακτική”6. 
 
6 One of the possible translations listed by Liddell & Scott (9th edn. 1996, p. 1458) to the word 
“πρακτική” is “effective”. Even though I opted to argue in favor of “active” as a more appropriate 
translation, I would not discard the possibility that “effective” also captures some aspects of what is 
at stake in the passage. It might be perfectly the case that with “πρακτική” Aristotle also intended to 
introduce the claim that reason should deliver an efficient performance, I mean, a performance that 
is effective in attaining its aims, be it either practical or theoretical. The occurrence of “πρακτική” in 
EN I.7 seems to encode this meaning as well. This is a meaning that is at play in the definition of 
phronesis (EN 1141b21-22). The occurrence of “πρακτική” in the definition of phronesis is designed 
to indicate that phronesis performs effectively its task of carrying out what is good for human beings. 
I’m grateful to Lucas Angioni for calling my attention to this aspect of the word “πρακτική”. For 
Angioni’s comments about some uses of “πρακτικός” in EN VI, see Angioni 2011, p. 306, 312-313, and 
324-325. 
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3. The Two Meanings of “τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος” 
 
In explaining his use of the Greek expression “τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος” in EN 
I.7, Aristotle starts out by putting flesh on the bones of his moral psychology. In 
EN I.7, Aristotle states only briefly what he means by the expression “τοῦ λόγον 
ἔχοντος”. The brief remark is fully developed in EN I.13 when the classification 
of the virtues is officially set forth. 
The division of the part possessing reason in EN I.7 is quite puzzling. 
Aristotle divides the part called “λόγον ἔχον” into two. One of them is said to be 
“λόγον ἔχον” insofar as it is obedient to reason and the other insofar as it 
possesses reason and exercises thought. That division unavoidably reminds us of 
the division proposed in EN I.13: 
 
T4 τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν 
ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων 
φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεταί 
πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα 
ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, 
διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ᾽ 
ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι (EN 1102b30-1103a3, highlights 
are mine). 
 
The appetitive and in generally desiring part does participate in it 
[reason] in a way, i.e. in so far as it is capable of listening to it and 
obeying it: it is the way one is reasonable when one takes account of 
advice from one’s father or loved ones, not when one has an account 
of things, as for example in mathematics. That the non-rational is in 
a way persuaded by reason is indicated by our practice of 
admonishing people, and all the different forms in which we 
reprimand and encourage them. If one should call this too 
‘possessing reason’, then the aspect of the soul that possesses reason 
will also be double in nature: one element of it will have it in the proper 
sense and in itself, another as something capable of listening as if to one’s 
father. 
 
In that chapter, Aristotle identifies the obedient part of the soul with the 
appetitive-and-in-generally-desiring part, which is firstly classified as non-
rational and then, a couple of lines later, as being rational to some extent. A 
sneaking suspicion that one may well have after comparing passages from EN I.7 
and EN I.13 in their entirety is the following: is one allowed to identify the 
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obedient part, that is, the appetitive-and-in-generally-desiring part, in EN I.13 
with the perceptive one introduced in EN I.7? As pieces of textual evidence for 
that, some passages from the De Anima where Aristotle defends the view that the 
presence of perception implies the presence of appetite can be quoted: 
 
T5 καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ 
τόπον, εἰ δ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ 
αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ 
ἐπιθυμία (De Anima 413b21-24). 
 
for each of the parts has perception and motion with respect to 
place, and if perception, then also imagination and desire; for 
wherever there is perception, there is also both pain and pleasure; 
and wherever these are, of necessity there is appetite as well 
(Shield’s translation). 
 
T6 ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε 
καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν [...] τὰ δὲ ζῷα 
πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις 
ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ 
ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη (De Anima 414a32-
b5). 
 
The nutritive faculty alone belongs to plants; both this and the 
perceptual faculty belong to others. But if the perceptual faculty, 
then also the desiderative faculty [...] And all animals have at least 
one kind of perception, touch. And that to which perception 
belongs, to this belongs also both pleasure and pain, as well as both 
the pleasurable and the painful; and to those things to which these 
belong also belongs appetite, since appetite is a desire for what is 
pleasurable (Shield’s translation). 
 
In these passages, Aristotle argues that the presence of perception implies 
the presence of appetite, establishing a close connexion between these two 
capacities. Given this textual evidence and, moreover, considering that the 
appetitive-and-in-generally-desiring part of the soul in EN I.13 can be hardly 
identified with the nutritive and vegetative part – which is dismissed out of hand 
as having nothing to do with human virtue7 – and much less with the rational 
 
7 On two occasions, the nutritive and vegetative part is said to have no importance to the ethical 
investigation: “[...] and we should leave the nutritive aspect of the soul to one side, since it appears by 
nature devoid of any share in human excellence” ([...] καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς 
ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν) (EN I.13 1102b11-12) and “of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, there 
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part strictly speaking in the context of the threefold division of the soul proposed 
in EN I.7, the reader may well be led to infer that EN I.13’s obedient part was 
surreptitiously introduced as the perceptive part in the function argument8. If 
that reading is in order, an important exegetical problem arises. Before saying 
that the human ergon consists of an active life of the λόγον-ἔχον part, Aristotle 
flatly ruled out the life of nutrition, growth, and also perception as candidates to 
that position. So the inclusion of this part of the soul on second thoughts as taking 
part in the human function in EN. 13 might sound unlikely. 
Aristotle’s argumentative moves in EN I.7 lead Fortenbaugh to argue that 
the division proposed in lines 1098a4-5 “runs within the biological faculty of 
thought” (Fortenbaugh 2006, p. 62, see also p. 125, footnote 22). One reason put 
forward by him to support his view is that emotions involve beliefs (for instance, 
the belief that there is a danger or that one suffers injustice), and beliefs belong 
to the biological faculty of thought9. In his view, had Aristotle identified the 
obedient part, responsible for the emotions (as it is made clear in EN II), with the 
perceptive soul, it would have been philosophically questionable. Fortenbaugh 
grounds his position by assuming that Aristotle is moving within the framework 
of his biological psychology in the first part of the ergon argument, which allows 
the reader to assume that the λόγον-ἔχον part of the soul is to be taken as the 
biological faculty of thought, within which then a further division is drawn 
(Fortenbaugh 2006, p. 67). In Fortenbaugh’s own words, “the obedient part of the 
bipartite soul is cognitive and therefore has a place within the biological faculty 
of thought” and “the sphere of moral virtue is cognitive and therefore overlaps 
the biological faculty of thought” (Fortenbaugh 2006, p. 67). 
 
is no excellence of a relevant sort; for there is nothing the doing or not doing of which depends on it” 
(τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ 
πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν) (EN VI.12 1144a9-11). 
8 A strategy to associate the obedient part of the soul presented in EN I.13 with the perceptive soul 
presented in EN I.7 is insinuated by Fortenbaugh and then dismissed out of hand: “More than a 
century ago, Bernays recognized that lines 1103a1-3 are a supplement. His explanation is instructive: 
Earlier in 1.7 1098a4, the obedient element in the soul was attributed to the λόγον ἔχον. Therefore, 
at the end of 1.13, Aristotle thinks himself constrained to add that this attribution is also permissible. 
The reference to 1098a4 is important, for here too the passionate part of the soul is brought within 
the λόγον ἔχον, and here too the inclusion is unexpected, so that as I see it, neither in 1.7 nor in 1.13 
is a gloss to be suspected. Rather, Aristotle has written both passages with a definite purpose in mind. 
He wants to make clear how the bipartite psychology of ethical theory relates to the biological 
psychology of the De Anima. In the early passage, clarification is certainly helpful and perhaps 
necessary. For Aristotle has used the psychology of the De Anima to determine the function of man. 
This use of the psychology of the De Anima could be misleading, so that a listener (or reader) might 
confuse bipartition with the biological psychology, i.e., he might believe that the divisions of the two 
psychologies coincide and that the obedient part of the bipartite soul is identical with the biological 
faculty of sensation. For that reason, Aristotle has added a note, making clear that the division of 
bipartition runs within the biological faculty of thought; that the obedient part of the bipartite soul 
and the biological faculty of sensation are not identical” (Fortenbaugh 2006, p. 61-62) 
9 Passages presented by Fortenbaugh to justify the need of beliefs in the emotions are the followings: 
EN III.6 1115a9, Rhetoric. 1382a21–22, 1378a30–33, and 1380b17–18. 
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Before addressing Fortenbaugh’s arguments, one needs to take a step back 
and take a careful look at how the expression “λόγον ἔχον” is employed in the 
EN. There is compelling evidence that Aristotle does not take this expression as 
having the same meaning throughout the EN. The term has its subtleties, which, 
in my view, rely in large measure on contextual issues. There are two occurrences 
of the expression “λόγον ἔχον” that represent a glaring example of the meaning 
shift. Whereas in EN I.13 Aristotle seems to allow that the appetitive-and-in-
generally-desiderative part of the soul be somehow described as “λόγον ἔχον” (EN 
1103a2-3), clearly adopting a broad meaning to the expression, the same 
expression is unexpectedly employed in EN VI.2 in a narrow sense in which only 
the properly rational parts are included. The broad meaning disappears in that 
chapter and the expression “λόγον ἔχον” encodes only the parts of the soul called 
“ἐπιστημονικόν” and “λογιστικόν”. As a result, one observes a meaning shift that 
invites the interpreter to be careful when comparing passages. For this reason, a 
contextual sensitivity is important to grasp what is at play in EN I.7. 
Back to EN I.7. It seems to me that the features assigned to the λόγον-ἔχον 
parts of the soul in lines 1098a4-5 are valuable clues that shed some light on how 
the expression “λόγον ἔχον” can be understood, even though at the end of the 
day the result delivered may not be as promising as we would expect. The 
descriptions might be reasonably taken as an effort made by Aristotle to 
discriminate the two parts called rational by assigning to each of them features 
that differentiate one from the other and that apply either for one or for the other, 
but not for both jointly. To put it another way, the features ascribed to each part 
has as its primary intention drawing a clear line of delimitation to each of them 
by means of exclusive features. In this view, what Aristotle does here is to contrast 
and oppose two ways of being said “λόγον ἔχον”. One way to be said “λόγον 
ἔχον” is as being obedient to reason (ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ). Here Aristotle employs 
a metaphorical language that will be enriched throughout EN 1.13. The other way 
to be said “λόγον ἔχον” is as having reason and exercising thought (ὡς ἔχον καὶ 
διανοούμενον). If one assumes that the latter features are exclusive to the second 
way of being said “λόγον ἔχον” (just as the former feature, that is, being obedient 
to reason, is proper to the first), it is plausible to take the passage as having the 
underlying idea that the features that belong to the first way of being said “λόγον 
ἔχον” should not be ascribed to the second one and also the other way around, a 
position that receives exegetical support from EN I.13, especially when one 
compares the parallels between that chapter and EN I.7. For instance, as Aristotle 
classifies the obedient part of the soul with a non-rational part of the soul 
(ἄλογος) in EN I.13, this may be arguably seen as evidence to deny to it the 
possibility of being described as “ὡς ἔχον [λόγον] καὶ διανοούμενον” and, 
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consequently, of being taken as having reason for itself, I mean, as having the 
power of exercising reasoning and language. 
I admit that saying that someone or something has reason (λόγον ἔχον) 
due to being obedient to reason is perhaps a philosophically unsound way to say 
it. Nonetheless, for the time being, it is more advisable to take Aristotle at his 
word, especially because the division proposed by him is only outlined in EN I.7 
and a lengthy treatment is provided later in chapter 13. Despite that, I think it is 
worth noticing that Aristotle arguably employs in EN I.7 a broad sense of the 
expression “λόγον ἔχον”, which cannot be accommodated within the biological 
faculty of thought, as Fortenbaugh in some way proposed, without severe 
difficulties. It seems that only the second characterization might be appropriately 
said to resemble the biological faculty of thought or even to be the biological 
faculty of thought. The first characterization is rational only in an extended and 
broad sense and apparently is a characterization proper to Aristotle’s moral 
psychology. That characterization will appear again later in EN I.13 and its details 
will be spelled out. So I opt to take the passage as it stands in the Aristotelian text 
and, additionally, assume that the obedient part does not have reason properly 
speaking and does not exercise thought because both attributes belong 
exclusively to the part that is rational in the strict sense. 
One last point: when it comes to the identification of the obedient part with 
the perceptive part of the soul, although this hypothesis may be speculated based 
on the textual support of some passages from De Anima, Aristotle, to the best of 
my knowledge, never claimed that explicitly in the EN. What we know with 
certainty is that the non-rational part whose good condition constitutes virtue of 
character is identified with the appetitive-and-in-generally-desiring part of the 
soul, which is influenced by reason. As far as the textual evidence in the EN is 
concerned, we need not take a step further and associate this part of the soul with 
the perceptive one in the threefold division found in EN I.7. 
In step T1.iii, Aristotle proceeds by saying that the human ergon is an 
activity based on reason or not without reason (ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
λόγου). In my reading, the Greek word “ἢ” can be taken as proposing an 
adjustment to the expression “ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον” for not capturing precisely 
the results previously achieved, because, as I have tried to show, there is one part 
of the λόγον-ἔχον part that does not possess reason in the strict sense but that, 
even so, maintains some interplay with reason. If my reading is correct, Aristotle 
cannot commit himself to the claim that the human ergon is exclusively an activity 
of reason, for the previous results achieved compel him to state that the human 
ergon is an activity that cannot be performed without reason. This new 
formulation is in tune with the posterior inclusion in EN I.13 of the exercise of 
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virtues of character, which are, at least partially, non-rational10, among the 
activities that promote eudaimonia. The second formulation makes room for the 
inclusion of the appetitive-and-in-generally-desiring part of the soul in the 
human ergon, posing a challenge to Fortenbaugh’s reading. If the twofold λόγον-
ἔχον division had been drawn within the rational part strictly speaking, Aristotle 
would not have had to add the expression “ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου”. The formulation 
“ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον” would have been a perfect fit for summing up his results. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The reading I have advanced is deflationary and I think that it harmonizes 
with the purpose of the investigation led by Aristotle in EN I.7. My main point in 
defending a deflationary reading is that the examined passages do not have the 
aim of setting out the details of Aristotle’s moral psychology. To put it differently, 
the moral psychology is not within EN I.7’s investigative focus. Moral 
psychology plays a role in this chapter within the limits imposed by the ergon 
argument. So the construal of the passage is restrained by some caveats. The 
details of moral psychology are fleshed out in EN I.13, which is definitely a 
chapter that should take pride of place in any attempt at fully understanding 
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